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Economics, Department of International Relations. 
Abstract: Because of their economic importance, international bond markets are thought to be the 
likely location for the operation of financial market pressures on emerging market (EM) government 
policy. An important but unresolved debate that runs through the literature is the relative importance of 
domestic factors specific to the country receiving the capital flows (pull factors), versus push factors 
exogenous to the receiving country, in driving portfolio flows to EMs. Through extensive interviews 
with financial market participants, and analysis of the financial press between January 2008 and 2013, 
this paper argues that not only were market participants fully aware of the importance of push factors 
over the cycle, but that their perceptions of the domestic fundamentals themselves were influenced by 
these push factors. The paper provides evidence on the micro-foundations of investment decision 
making that make investors susceptible to influence by the push factors, and adds to a growing body of 
evidence that financial market borrowing costs are even less in the control of emerging market 
governments than previously assumed, because even when investors pay attention to domestic 
fundamentals, their assessments can be divorced from reality. This means that government efforts to 
attract foreign capital through implementing investors’ preferred policies may be ultimately futile. 
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Introduction:	the	importance	of	portfolio	flows	to	EM	governments	
Since the widespread liberalisation of capital accounts began in the 1980s, 
private capital flows to emerging market (EM) 1 countries have surpassed official 
flows, and gained paramount importance. Other trends, including the increasing 
importance of institutional investors, and increased complexity of financial 
instruments have had a profound impact on capital flows to EMs, and provoked an 
increase in scholarly attention to the way in which financial markets work. 
International government bond markets have long been considered to hold a special 
status since price changes in these markets determine the cost and availability of EM 
government’s borrowing in hard currency.  In the absence of the ability to borrow or 
refinance on these markets, countries face the prospect of default, or resorting to IMF 
assistance. High borrowing costs caused by investor exit can have significant 
economy-wide consequences, causing a deterioration in both the government’s fiscal 
position and domestic bank balance sheets, as well as higher interest rates throughout 
the rest of the economy which can affect investment and consumption decisions (De 
Grauwe 2011; Gros 2012; Rommerskirchen 2015).  
Sovereign bond markets therefore provide a most likely location for the 
operation of financial market pressures on government policy (Mosley 2003; Hardie 
2006; Hardie 2011). To maintain access to international bond markets at low interest 
rates, governments need to take into account investors’ policy preferences (Brooks et 
al. 2015), which usually include tight monetary and fiscal policy in order to control 
public debt and inflation, and other neoliberal reforms (Mosley 2000, 2003; Tomz and 
Wright 2007; Lierse and Seelkopf 2016). This structural dependence (Lierse and 
Seelkopf 2016; Strange 1996) of governments on bond markets has led scholars and 
policy makers alike to decry the power of ‘bond market vigilantes (Krugman 2009) 
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who impose their preferences on governments at the expense of the electorate. At the 
same time, advocates of market discipline applaud the perceived ability of bond 
markets to enforce sound policies (Helleiner 1995, 324; Rommerskirchen 2015). 
Similarly, the IFIs regularly advise developing countries to adopt the policy mix 
favoured by financial market investors in order to attract foreign capital and lower 
their borrowing costs (Stiglitz 2005, 21).  However, these arguments about financial 
market constraint hinge on the market price actually reflecting domestic policies (pull 
factors), rather than reflecting global factors exogenous to the country in question 
(push factors), because in order for markets to punish policies they don’t like, they 
must actually be responsive to them in the first place2.  
Relying on extensive interviews with market participants and examination of 
the financial press, this paper argues that not only was the post-global financial crisis 
(GFC) investment boom into EM sovereign bonds driven by push factors, including 
some not emphasised in existing literature such as crisis in unrelated markets that 
offered a similar risk/return profile, but also that investors’ perceptions of domestic 
fundamentals (the pull factors) were themselves influenced by these push factors, and 
so became divorced from reality. In addition to the macro-level push factors 
themselves, the micro-foundations of investors’ decision making, including investors’ 
reliance on heuristics and shortcuts, the ways in which investors used market data to 
predict market reactions to changes in the push and pull factors, and the investment 
mandates and business models of institutional investors, made investors even more 
susceptible to the influence of push over pull factors.  
 This paper therefore contributes to a growing body of evidence that financial 
market borrowing costs are even less in the control of emerging market governments 
than previously assumed, because investors assessments of fundamentals can be, and 
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often are, divorced from reality. EM countries that try to attract capital through 
adopting policies they think foreign investors prefer might find this strategy 
ultimately futile.   
Determinants of portfolio flows to EMs: The pull versus push factor framework 
Ever since the seminal work of Calvo et al. (1993) which introduced the 
framework in order to explain the rebound of capital inflows to Latin America after 
the 1980s debt crisis, a central unresolved debate that runs through the vast literature 
on the determinants of portfolio flows to emerging markets is the relative importance 
of pull factors, or domestic factors specific to the country receiving the capital flows, 
versus push factors exogenous to the receiving country. The difference is important 
because if pull factors determine capital flows, the implication is that if EM 
governments pursue the policies that international investors like, they can successfully 
attract capital into their countries and lower their international borrowing costs. 
However, if push factors are more important, this implies that attempts to attract 
capital in order to reduce borrowing costs will ultimately be unsuccessful because 
capital flows are determined by factors outside EM government’s control. 
Furthermore, the only way to mitigate the harmful effects of these volatile flows 
would be to institute capital controls.  
A number of studies find that pull factors determine portfolio flows into or out 
of EMs. These can include the government’s fiscal, monetary, and structural policies, 
domestic macroeconomic variables such as debt ratios, external balances, foreign 
exchange reserves, and GDP growth (Ahmed and Zlate 2013; De Vita and Kyaw 
2008; Kim and Wu 2008; Duade and Fratzscher 2008), micropolicy indicators such as 
the components of fiscal spending, sources of government revenue, and structure of 
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the pension system (Mosley 2003, 126), and even domestic political events such as 
elections, ideology of the ruling party, or regime type (Martinez and Santiso 2003; 
Vaaler et al. 2005; Bechtel 2009; Hardie 2006; Campello 2015). 
Other studies argue that market prices do not accurately reflect country 
fundamentals because portfolio flows are mostly dependent macro-level push factors, 
largely exogenous to the country in question. Numerous studies have found cyclical 
push factors have an effect, for example when AE interest rates, especially US interest 
rates are low, capital flows to EMs where interest rates are generally higher, and vice 
versa (Calvo et al. 1996; Eichengreen and Mody 1998; Fratzcher et al 2013; Koepke 
2014; Dahlhaus and Vasishtha 2014). Because EM bonds are seen as riskier 
investments than AE bonds, during boom periods when investors are less risk averse, 
investment flows to EM assets, while during periods of risk aversion, investors 
reallocate capital to safe haven assets in AEs (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille 2011; Forbes 
and Warnock 2012; Broner et al. 2013; Ghosh et al 2014). More recent IPE literature 
argues that EMs might not be constrained during boom periods, because global 
liquidity is abundant and investors pay little to country specific policies. During bust 
periods however, investors’ negative reactions to left-wing policies have significant 
consequences for EMs due to capital scarcity (Campello 2015).  
Despite the exponential rise of AE institutional investors since the 1980s, with 
the asset management industry intermediating assets amounting to $76 trillion (100% 
of world GDP and 40% of global financial assets) as of 2015 (IMF 2015, 94), fewer 
studies have paid attention to the micro-foundations of these investors’ decision-
making behaviour, which cannot be fully captured by the pull-push factor framework 
(Braun 2015, 2016; Koepke 2015, 19-20; Wullweber 2015). Hardie (2012) illustrates 
that different types of investors have varied investment strategies and capacities for 
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exit, and therefore, have different implications for financial stability. Foreign 
institutional investors in particular, are the most important actors in international 
capital markets (Mosley 2003, 27) 3. According to IMF estimates, foreign asset 
managers alone owned approximately 80% of all foreign held EM debt by 2012 
(Arslanalp and Tsuda 2014, 19).  
Within the foreign institutional investors category, more recent research tends 
to follow Maxfield (1998)’s distinction between long-term, diversification4 oriented 
investors which seek to balance their assets and liabilities, such as insurance and 
pension funds, and so pay more attention to domestic fundamentals, and short-term 
profit oriented investors such as mutual funds, hedge funds, and private wealth 
managers that invest on the behalf of clients to which they promise competitive 
yields, and so are influenced mainly by push factors (Hardie 2006; BIS 2007; 
Tsatsaronis 2000; Gelos 2011; Raddatz and Schmukler 2012) 5. Studies have also 
have found evidence of shorter term investors deviating from the fundamentals due to 
herding behaviour, where it may be optimal (in profit terms) for investors to disregard 
their private information and instead imitate the behaviour of their peers, and 
contagion where problems in one EM country led investors to expect similar 
problems in other EM countries, even when these had sound fundamentals (Kaminsky 
Lyons and Schmukler 2001; Gelos 2011; Claessens and Forbes 2013). Other studies 
highlight how due to information asymmetry or bounded rationality, investors rely on 
heuristics or cognitive shortcuts such as sovereign ratings or category based 
reasoning, instead of conducting detailed analysis of country-specific fundamentals 
(Gray 2013; Gray and Hicks 2014; Brooks et al. 2015). 
However, the literature continues to make contradictory findings on the 
relative importance of pull versus push factors, which is unsurprising given results 
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depend on the way in which capital flows are measured, the country sample, time 
period and data frequency used (see Koepke 2015).  Most existing literature treats 
pull factors and push factors as analytically distinct categories in order to measure 
their relative importance, but does not pay sufficient attention to the interaction 
between the two. In a globalised world, external developments can have a real impact 
on domestic fundamentals, for example, portfolio inflows can significantly change 
macroeconomic conditions and policy6. The push factors can also impact on how 
investors interpret the pull factors, for example, global risk aversion could result in a 
more negative interpretation of the same domestic fundamentals, and vice versa for 
boom times. Nor is enough attention paid to the micro-foundations of investment 
behaviour, despite its importance in understanding how investors form their 
expectations of EM bond prices, and why investors might be prone to ignore or 
misinterpret domestic fundamentals. With some exceptions (Brookes et al. 2015), it is 
usually taken for granted that when investors do pay attention to pull factors, their 
perceptions of these actually reflect material conditions  
As financial markets are forward looking, prices depend not only on current 
conditions, but also on future expectations of their evolution. Keynes, in his famous 
beauty contest metaphor, argued that due to the future being unknowable in principle, 
or ‘fundamentally uncertain’ (Keynes 1937, 217), financial market investors are 
forced to ‘speculate’ or predict ‘what average opinion expects the average opinion [of 
other investors] to be’ (Keynes 1936, 156) when making investment decisions. 
Kindleberger builds on Keynes’ work to show how financial markets have historically 
gone through repeated cycles of ‘mania, panic, and crash’, where push factors such as 
international liquidity cause asset prices to become over-inflated during the mania 
phase, and undervalued during the panic phase  (Kindleberger 1978). It is therefore 
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investors’ perceptions of pull factors that are relevant in driving portfolio flows, not 
the pull factors themselves, and even when investors do pay attention to the domestic 
fundamentals, their interpretations of these could be influenced by push factors, and 
divorced from reality.  
These dynamics are illustrated through an examination of the drivers of 
portfolio investment into EM bonds between 2008 and 2013, through one cycle of 
panic and crash, following the GFC, and then mania after 2009. It is argued that while 
the push factors changed dramatically over this period, no fundamental re-orientation 
in policy direction occurred in major EMs during and after the crisis. During the crisis 
period, capital outflows were driven by risk aversion due to developments in AEs. 
During the mania period, rather than improved country fundamentals attracting 
inflows, increased inflows that were pushed into EMs by a combination of macro-
level push factors contributed to an improvement in investors’ expectations regarding 
the fundamentals. Micro-level characteristics made investors more susceptible to the 
influence of these macro-push factors, and encouraged investors to allocate their 
portfolios according to their predictions of market movements rather than their 
personal views of domestic fundamentals. Investors were not only aware of the 
influence of push factors on market movements, but relied on various shortcuts and 
heuristics to try and predict market opinion with regards to both push factors and 
domestic fundamentals. Institutional investors’ business models, which required them 
to make a certain amount of profit to remain viable, and their investment mandates, 
which forced them to follow ratings agencies, exacerbated pro-cyclicality. This was 
the case not only for profit oriented short-term investors, but also diversification 
oriented patient capital, as the distinction between the two became blurred in a low 
interest rate environment.  
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Research methods 
In order to enable a fine grained understanding of how push and pull factors 
affect investment decisions, and how investors views of fundamentals evolved over 
time, qualitative methods were favoured over quantitative, and depth over scope. 
While quantitative methods give us valuable information about market movements, 
they are unable to shed light on investors’ motivations behind those outcomes. In-
depth, semi-structured interviews were preferred over other qualitative methods like 
surveys because they allowed an understanding of investors’ opinions and thought 
processes at a level of granularity that surveys are rarely able to achieve, and 
facilitated more accurate interpretation of data due to contextual information obtained 
from face-to-face interviews (Lynch 2013; Mosley 2013, 6-7). 
41 Semi-structured interviews with EM bond market participants were 
conducted in Hong Kong, a major global financial centre for EM trading, and 
Singapore, a regional hub for EM institutional investors, between 19/01/2013 and 
11/04/2013 (See appendix 1 for a list of interviews). Due to the concentrated nature of 
the industry, the largest investors, which were the most important in driving prices, 
were targeted through snowballing, until the saturation point was reached. Interviews 
focused on market participants based on relevant sales and trading desks in four major 
investment banks who, as market makers, could give both their own views, as well as 
those of their institutional investor clients7, thus making the interviews much more 
representative than would have been possible by interviewing a similar number of 
institutional investors. A smaller number of portfolio managers (PMs) at large and 
medium sized institutional investors were interviewed in order to crosscheck the 
information gained from investment bank interviewees. 
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In order to document how investors’ perceptions of domestic fundamentals 
changed over time, in addition to interviews, a comprehensive analysis of the 
financial press between the period 01/01/2008, just before the GFC intensified, and 
until interviews were conducted 19/01/2013, was conducted using Factiva8, analysing 
over 170,000 words of text. These articles were supplemented by documents such as 
bank research publications and memos, obtained from interviewees. This information 
was triangulated with quantitative data on bond yield and market capitalization 
movements for a number of well-known EM bond indices9, data on investment flows 
where available10, and the relevant macroeconomic indicators. 
EM inflows during and after the GFC: a full cycle of panic, crash, and 
mania  
After providing some context on the major EM investors during the time 
period under consideration, as well as on how emerging markets have become 
increasingly grouped together as an asset class, the following sections discuss how the 
macro-level push factors, micro foundations of investment behaviour, as well as 
investors’ perceptions of domestic fundamentals, guided capital flows to EMs through 
the cycle of panic, crash, and mania.  
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Who is ‘the market’?  
Figure 1. Major foreign investors in EM government bonds 
Source: Interviews 
Although exact breakdowns are not available11, figure 1 identifies the most 
important foreign investors in EM sovereign bonds for the period under study and 
their relative time horizons for holding EM securities.  
The global asset management industry is dominated by a small number of 
large players. In 2012, the top five  accounted for 18% of total assets under 
management (AUM), with the largest player representing nearly 6% of the total 
(Miyajima and Shim 2014). The largest asset managers involved in EM bonds include 
PIMCO, Ashmore Group, Franklin Templeton Investments, Fidelity World Wide 
Investment, Aberdeen Asset Management, and Bluebay Asset Management 
(Interview 6, Investment Bank, Emerging Asia Sovereign Research). Important 
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differences within the mutual funds12 category worth mentioning are ‘crossover’ 
versus ‘dedicated’ investors, and ‘open’ and ‘closed end’ funds. While ‘dedicated’ 
EM funds are constrained by their mandate to invest in EMs, and their performance is 
‘benchmarked’ to an EM index, ‘crossover’ funds can invest across asset classes. 
These funds can be either open end, which means that their clients can withdraw 
funds whenever they feel the fund is underperforming, or closed end, in which the 
clients cannot freely withdraw their funds13.  
Although IMF reports suggest that dedicated and closed end funds should 
provide more stability to EM markets because it is harder for them to move their 
investments elsewhere during a crisis period (IMF 2004, 111; 2014, 70), the findings 
presented in this paper suggest that even closed-end dedicated EM investors still have 
the possibility for exit, because they can go ‘underweight’ the EM index by selling 
EM securities and increasing their holdings of cash reserves (Interviews).  
Contrary to the traditional distinction between short-term asset managers and 
longer-term diversification oriented investors like pension and insurance funds, 
interviewees pointed out that in practise, even the most conservative funds, but 
especially defined benefit pension funds, allocate part of their capital to longer-term 
safe investments, but then use the remainder to make risky short-term investments in 
order to ‘realise extra yield’ (Interview 7, Investment Bank, EM Local Rates 
Strategy). This is done by placing capital in shorter-term mutual funds or relying on 
external investment consultants (ibid; Figure 1).  
Other important investors include investment bank traders. Although 
technically market-makers14, providing liquidity to the market and hedging their risk 
rather than taking speculative positions, these traders indicated during interviews that 
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in practice, they can never completely hedge their risk, and end up speculating on 
future price movements15. Newer investors in EM include foreign central banks, 
sovereign wealth funds, and university endowment funds that invest their savings in 
order to boost earnings, even though they have no client base requiring them to do so.  
Financial innovations make it possible for even corporate non-financial 
companies to invest in EMs countries in order to boost their profits. Investment banks, 
though technically only supposed to help corporates with hedging foreign exchange 
risk in EM, in fact help them gain exposure through derivatives to speculate on EM 
interest rates, credit risk, or currencies. These trades were disguised as ‘lowering 
borrowing costs’ (Interview 12, Investment Bank, Corporate Foreign Exchange Sales, 
Interview 15, Investment Bank, China Corporate Financing). 
Emerging markets as an asset class 
Despite consisting of a large number of countries with diverse fundamentals, 
EMs are increasingly invested in as a group or an ‘asset class’ by financial market 
investors. This means that while some divergence between individual country yields 
remains, EM bond yields have become increasingly correlated over time (Mauro et al 
2002, McGuire and Schrijvers 2003), and have been especially so since the 2008 
crisis (Arslanalp and Tsuda 2014; Miyajima and Shim 2014; IMF 2015). This has 
been linked with the rise of the asset management industry, and increased importance 
of institutional investors and their short-term profit motives, which increases demand 
for easily definable categories to aid them in managing their portfolios (Gray 2013; 
Miyajima and Shim 2014). In particular, the increased popularity of index-linked 
investment, and the use of common indices by the largest EM investors, and 
correlation between the main indices can lead them to adopt similar asset allocation 
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strategies, and thus to increased correlation between country yields (Miyajima and 
Shim 2014).  
Most EM investors benchmark their performance to an EM index, either being 
‘active’ (trying to produce a higher yield than the index for their clients)16, or 
‘passive’ (mimicking the index exactly). ‘Dedicated’ EM funds are always 
benchmarked to an index, while ‘crossover’ investors can still be connected to an 
index even if they are not benchmarked to it, by asking their fund managers to beat a 
particular index, or by using index derivatives to manage exposure to index member 
countries (Interview 36, Investment advisory firm, PM). This means that many 
investors decide to include ‘EMs’ as a whole, or through sub-indices, in their 
portfolios without much regard for variations in country specific fundamentals within 
the index (Interviews). Even small changes in the portfolio allocation of large 
investors can have a major impact on EM prices due to the massive scale of their 
investments relative to small and illiquid EM financial markets. Their behaviour also 
has knock on effects through its effect on the sentiment of smaller investors 
(Interview 6, Investment Bank, Emerging Asia Sovereign Research; Interview 33, 
Investment Management Company, CEO), magnifying the importance of the major 
indices relative to individual country fundamentals. 
A small number of EM indices, which are themselves correlated, are used 
widely (Miyajima and Shim 2014). For example, BIS estimates that two JPMorgan 
EMBI Global indices are used for up to 34% of the total assets under management of 
EM bond funds (Miyajima and Shim 2014, author’s calculations) The most popular or 
‘benchmark’ EM bond index is JP Morgan’s hard currency Emerging Markets Bond 
Index Global (EMBIG), which interviewees confirmed that the largest EM investors 
all track closely. Inclusion in an index, which is usually dependent on sovereign 
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ratings17, has an important automatic effect on the price of the bond in question as it 
means an increased capital inflow into that bond, from all those investors 
benchmarked to or investing in the index. Conversely, falling out of an index, as the 
result of a ratings downgrade, means a huge capital outflow out of a country’s bond 
(Interviews).  
Investors can also access sub-sections of the EM asset class category, which 
are usually divided by risk perception. Local currency bonds, accessed through the JP 
Morgan’s local currency Government Bond Index-Emerging Markets (GBI-EM) 
include additional currency and interest rate risk, while EM corporate bonds accessed 
through JP Morgan’s Corporate Emerging Markets Bonds Index (CEMBI) are 
perceived as riskier than sovereign guaranteed debt, and EM equities accessed though 
the MSCI EM are the riskiest. ‘Frontier markets’ consist of less developed countries, 
with less established capital markets, and are considered even more risky than Ems 
(Interview 11, Investment Bank, Local currency bond trader; Interview 32, 
Investment Bank, EM credit research). Official regional divisions include Asia, Latin 
America, Middle East and North Africa, Eastern Europe, although the major indices 
are not usually divided by region (Interview 6, Investment Bank, Asia sovereign 
research; Interview 7, Investment Bank, Latin America sovereign research). 
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The 2008 crisis: from mania to crash 
 
Figure 2. Investor sentiment and investment into EM sovereign bond markets, 
2007-2013 
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(a) Sept-07: Northern Rock liquidity crisis; (b) Sept-08: US govt bailout of Freddie Max and 
Fanny Mae; (c) Sept-08: Lehman Brother files for bankruptcy; (d) Sept-08: HBOS bailed out by 
Lloyds; (e) Oct-08: TARP pushed through Congress; (f) Oct-08: Coordinated central bank rate 
cut (including Fed, BoE, ECB); (g) Nov-08: China announces fiscal stimulus; (h) Nov-08: Fed 
launches QE1; (i) Mar-09: BoE launches QE; (j) Apr-09: G20 agrees on global stimulus package 
worth $5trn. commitment from the G20 group of countries to triple IMF’s resources to $750bn; 
(k) Oct-09: True state of Greek finances revealed; (l) Apr-09: Greek debt downgraded to junk; 
(m) May-10: Greek bailout - start of Eurozone crisis; (n) Nov-10: Fed launches QE2; (o) Nov-
10: Irish bailout; (p) May-11: ECB bails out Portugal; (q) Jul-11: Second Greek bailout; (r) Aug-
11: S&P downgrades US debt ; (s) Dec-11: ECB Longer Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO) 
1st round; (t) Feb-12: ECB LTRO 2nd round; (u) Sept-12: Fed announces QE3. 
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Source: Market capitalisation data for JPM EMBI Global Composite index 
from Bloomberg, time line from FACTIVA; VIX CBOE Volatility Index from 
Chicago Board Options Exchange 
Note: The JP Morgan EMBIG is a widely used proxy for investment in 
emerging markets18. The VIX index measures the implied volatility of S&P 500 index 
options and is a widely used proxy for investor risk sentiment, with a high value 
representing increased expectations of volatility, in other words, risk aversion. 
Macro-level push factors 
In the pre-crisis boom period, investment in EMs had been on a steady upward 
trend, with market capitalization of the EMBIG rising by over 120% between 2000 
and 2007, as investor sentiment remained positive (figure 2), with reports that EM 
fundamentals as being  ‘much stronger today than they've been any recent time period 
we can look at, given what's going on with exports, trade, current accounts and 
economic growth’ (Head of EM debt at JPMorgan Asset Management, cited in Casey 
2008).  
In late 2008, the GFC officially began with the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers on 15th September, and investors became risk averse, as shown by the 
dramatic increase in the VIX and shifted their capital into safer AE assets. As a result, 
EM prices fell dramatically (Figure 2, point c) .  
Micro-foundations of investment behaviour 
Investors were aware of the importance of macro-level push factors, and used 
a set of indicators to measure them, in order to better predict market reactions. 
According to interviews, they used certain high frequency data releases, such as US 
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consumer confidence, non-farm payrolls, and industrial production, and Chinese trade 
data, as a proxy for global risk sentiment. Negative data releases during the post-
Lehman period indicated that other investors were becoming risk averse, and likely to 
exit EMs, prompting further disinvestment (Interview 28, Investment Bank, USD EM 
credit trader). Similarly, interviewees also directly kept track of ‘fund flows’, the 
portfolio allocation decisions of other investors, especially the largest ones (Interview 
6, Investment Bank, Emerging Asia Sovereign Research). According to interviewees, 
this was done through word of mouth, reports on the financial news, and proprietary 
data services that track fund flows, such as EPFR. During this time, mutual fund 
flows reversed (IMF 2009), as cross-over investors left EMs altogether, while 
dedicated EM funds saw ‘unprecedented redemptions’, and even closed-end EM 
funds reduced their EM exposure, by going ‘underweight’ the EM index and 
increasing their cash reserves  (Griffin 2009; Interview 31, Investment Bank, EM 
Sales). These reports sent negative signals to investors and triggered further outflows 
(Interviews). 
When they did assess the domestic fundamentals, most investors, including 
investment bank traders, or fund portfolio managers tended to cover large numbers of 
countries (up to 40 or 50), which combined with the large amounts of available 
information, made it humanly impossible to have an in depth knowledge about each 
one of them (Interviews)19. According to the CEO of an investment fund ‘It is very 
difficult for even sophisticated individuals to do a lot of research on the credit 
worthiness or certain countries or certain companies. I don’t care how smart you are, 
its just impossible for you to do that much analysis’ (Interview 33, Investment 
Management Company, CEO). This forced investors to rely heavily on shortcuts and 
heuristics, such internal rules for selling securities based on ratings downgrades, or 
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increases in CDS spreads. In particular, many funds are required by their mandate to 
invest only in bonds that have investment-grade ratings from all the major ratings 
agencies (Interviews).   
The ratings agencies began to downgrade a number of EMs after September 
2008: according to the chair of S&P's sovereign ratings committee ‘If our analysis is 
correct, this EM class as a whole has peaked in credit quality’ (Litner 2008). Investors 
were aware that ratings downgrades tended to follow rather than predict the fall in 
EM bond prices:  ‘Rating agencies have to make a call. And often their call lags 
where the market is at, even subprime can be rated AAA by them… We all know 
there are limitations’ (Interview 30, Investment Bank, Debt Capital Markets). 
Nonetheless ratings remained a key heuristic for domestic fundamentals during the 
crisis because of institutional investors’ mandates: ‘I followed very closely those EMs 
borderline, about to become high yield if they were downgraded even one more notch. 
That doesn’t mean necessarily that’s it’s a bad credit, but what that means is that a lot 
of funds have mandates where they can only invest in investment grade credit, so they 
had to pull their money out [of EMs]… like on that day’ (Interview 29, Investment 
Bank, EM Credit Trader).   
Interviewees also relied on more market based measures such as the credit 
default swap spread to inform their analysis of country-specific sovereign default risk 
‘because, all the big guys [largest funds], they are trading the CDS, so that market 
price is probably the best reflection of what people think about this credit’ (Interview 
33, Investment Management Company, CEO). During the crisis period, widening 
CDS spreads20 were interpreted as deterioration in the fundamentals, as well as a 
signal that large investors were selling off EM bonds, and that market sentiment was 
turning negative (Interview 29, Investment Bank, EM Credit Trader).  
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While interviewees tracked news events that could affect EM prices on a daily 
basis, this was done not just to form a personal opinion, but also in order to predict the 
market reaction to the news event. One interviewee termed this phenomenon the 
‘BBC effect’ saying that if a news story appeared on major outlets BBC, Reuters, 
Bloomberg, or the FT, it immediately became important, as it was virtually 
guaranteed that all international investors would hear about it, and thus it would have 
an affect on prices. The interviewee also acknowledged that ‘this is stupid because 
there could be something big going on for three weeks and if it doesn’t make the 
international headlines then no one will know about it and it wont affect the market’ 
(Interview 2, Investment Bank, Sovereign Credit and CDS Trading).  Therefore, even 
if investors were aware of domestic fundamentals in great detail, their actual 
investment strategy would only take into account those new events that ‘moved the 
market’. During the crisis period the most important news events centred around 
details of the various bailout packages in the core economies (Interview 2, Investment 
Bank, Sovereign Credit and CDS Trading; see figure 2). According to an investment 
banker specializing in debt capital markets ‘when there is a big crisis like we had in 
2008, macro factors like the US and China and how they’re doing impact the market, 
the country is not the epicenter’ (Interview 30, Investment Bank, Debt capital 
markets). 
This reliance on shortcuts, and the importance of the ‘average opinion’ 
relative to personal opinions, made it easier for the push factors to influence the 
interpretation of domestic pull factors themselves. The combination of negative data 
releases for sentiment proxies, information on investment funds reallocating their 
capital to safer assets, and deterioration of key heuristics like ratings and CDS 
	 21	
spreads, resulted in a negative feedback loop which caused EM prices to continue 
falling, and causing sentiment to deteriorate further as prices continued falling.  
Some investors did not believe that the drastic fall in prices reflected EM 
country fundamentals. According to RBC Capital Markets21  ‘In this extreme global 
financial stress environment, movements in emerging financial markets have been, 
and should continue to be, driven by core market developments. In many cases, 
moves have been inconsistent with fundamentals, and will very likely continue to 
behave erratically until core markets stabilise’ (Badawy 2008a). Despite their 
personal views about fundamentals, investors were still forced to trade according to 
the opinion of the ‘average’, or else make losses in the short term. Mutual funds could 
not afford this because of their business models that promised short term competitive 
returns to their clients. According to market analysts: ‘Billions of dollars have been 
taken out of these markets due to panic selling ‘, but, ‘At times like these it is not 
about the fundamental stories. It is about getting your money back’ (Griffin 2008)22.  
Investor perceptions of fundamentals during the crash 
In accordance with the change in push factors, and amplified by the micro-
foundations of investment decision making, investors’ interpretations of the domestic 
fundamentals turned sharply negative during this time period. During the height of the 
panic phase, in September 2008, investors stopped paying much attention to country 
fundamentals altogether, reflected in a lack of reporting on EM domestic 
fundamentals in the financial press.  
By November 2008, when panic subsided and investors once again began 
paying attention to the pull factors, EMs were said to be suffering from ‘weaker 
economic fundamentals - either current account deficits, or interventionist 
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government policies, or strong reliance on a single source of revenue’ (Badawy 
2008b), even though investors had been praising EM fundamentals only a few months 
ago. It was widely feared that a decline in domestic demand in the advanced countries 
would lead to a fall in EM exports, lower trade surpluses, and cause a growth slow-
down there as well (Griffin 2008; Oakley 2008).  Latin American countries were seen 
to be suffering from currency appreciation, inflation and weakening external balances 
(Sivathambu 2008). Asian countries, which had been commended for their ‘newfound 
commitment to orthodox policies and stable prices’ as recently as February 2008 
(Casey 2008), were seen to have the ‘most pronounced risks’ as it was predicted that 
‘political controls and fiscal measures’ would lead to ‘greater distortions in the 
longer-term’ (Sivathambu 2008). There were also worries that Asia's trade surplus 
was beginning to narrow since 2007 (Sivathambu 2008). Previously seen as an 
advantage, over reliance on commodity exports was now seen as a major risk, as 
analysts pointed out the negative impact a decline in commodity prices could have on 
the real economy of commodity exporting EM countries (Badawy 2008b). Somewhat 
contradictorily, at the same time as fears over slowing growth, inflation was seen by 
some as ‘the biggest threat’ facing EMs (Sivathambu 2008).  
From post-crisis recovery to the Eurozone Crisis: a mania in full swing (2009-2013) 
Macro-level push factors 	
As has been well documented in the literature, at the macro-level, the 
governments of major economies launched massive quantitative easing programs in 
response to the GFC, which made large pools of cash available to investors, and 
lowered AE interest rates. As risk sentiment gradually recovered, interest rate 
differentials prompted AE investors to re-allocate this capital to higher interest rate 
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EM markets: according to Ashmore Group PLC23 ‘with yields in the developed world 
either high for a good reason or yielding next to nothing, EM debt looks highly 
attractive’ (Ashmore Group PLC 2012).  The recovery in EM bonds began towards 
the end of 2008, when outflows began decelerating, and eventually reversing (figure 
2), and the rally in EM bonds was considered to be in full swing by mid-2009 
(Foundation and Endowment Money Management 2009). 
When the Eurozone crisis officially struck with the Greek bailout in May 
2010, global risk aversion triggered a sell-off in EM bonds as investors moved back 
into AE safe assets (Figure 2 points m and r), just as they had during the 2008 crisis. 
Despite overwhelmingly negative sentiment as shown by the repeated increases in the 
VIX in figure 2, this sell-off proved to be remarkably short lived, unlike that during 
200824. Instead, investment into EMs accelerated (figure 2), as capital that had 
previously been invested across different higher-yielding asset classes during the pre-
2007 boom became increasingly concentrated in EMs. Interviewees cited the 
reallocation of capital from peripheral Eurozone to EM bonds as one of the main 
drivers of price increases between 2010 and 2013. For example, according to an EM 
bond trader: 
 ‘Prices are driven by people pulling money out of Europe, putting it into EMs… you 
want some sort of return… you got all these investors looking for assets to park their 
money… And that’s what’s been happening over the last several years, over the last two or 
three years since the Eurozone crisis has intensified [2010-13]. Many of the EM countries 
fundamentals are not improving and yet they are benefitting from this huge amount of roll-off 
cash’ (Interview 28, Investment Bank, USD EM Credit Trading).  
Risk perceptions of EMs started to change accordingly, as AE financial assets 
began to be seen as more risky. Investment banks’ reports began to market EMs as an 
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asset class that possessed ‘safe haven’ characteristics, yet promised the necessary high 
returns. According to an anonymous investment bank publication: 
 ‘2012 will be remembered as the year that EM fixed income [bonds] cemented its 
position as a mainstream investment-grade asset class… EM sovereigns are now seen as a 
flight-to-quality trade due to their strong balance sheet and net external creditor position… 
providing equity-like total returns’ (Anonymous Investment Bank 2012, 1-3). 
Micro-foundations of investment behaviour 
Micro-level factors reinforced the concentration of capital in EMs. Soon after 
investors withdrew capital from Peripheral Eurozone bonds en-mass as risk 
perceptions of this asset class suddenly worsened, they found that their business 
models still required them to make a higher return than would be possible by 
investing in AE safe haven assets alone. An investment bank trader described the why 
his asset manager clients moved into EMs: ‘I need to make money, I need to earn 
interest or face redemptions… basically because of the low interest rate 
environment… people are forced to invest their money into something’ (Interview 28, 
Investment Bank, USD EM Credit Trading). 
Investors did not look at particular financial assets in a vacuum, but make their 
portfolio allocations on a ‘relative value basis’, choosing between different asset 
classes based on the profits they offer balanced with their perceived riskiness 
(Interview 34, Investment Management Company, Portfolio Manager). According to 
interviews, during the early and mid 2000s, key ‘high yielding’ asset classes seen to 
have a similar risk and return profile included EMs, US subprime mortgage backed 
securities, and Eurozone peripheral bonds, among others. Following the bursting of 
the US subprime bubble in end-2007, the poor performance of commodities after the 
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crisis, and the bursting of the peripheral Eurozone bubble in 2010, EMs remained as 
one of the few relatively high yielding asset classes remained that were not perceived 
as too risky (interviews).  
Just as they had created negative feedback loops during the crisis period, 
micro-level dynamics contributed to intensifying the mania by creating positive 
feedback loops. Key data releases such as the US ISM manufacturing index showed 
signs of improvement, as the US and China began to recover after massive stimulus 
programs (Deutsche Bank 2011, 13). In keeping with the general investor sentiment, 
ratings agencies upgraded a number of EM sovereign bonds to the key ‘investment 
grade’ status between 2009 and 2012. As of September 2012, 53.5% of the bonds 
included in JP Morgan's EMBIG index had an investment grade rating, compared to 
only 1.7% at the index's inception in 1993 (Ratner 2009). Ratings agencies cited not 
only improving fundamentals, but also the post-2009 capital inflows themselves as a 
reason for the upgrades (Rowley 2012). In turn, the upgrades had further positive 
feedback effects on investor sentiment, intensifying the self-fulfilling cycle of 
mania25.  
As EM prices rose, even those asset managers who were sceptical that price 
increases reflected fundamentals were forced to scale up their exposure, to prevent 
clients from moving their money to competitor funds offering higher returns. 
Dedicated EM bond funds increased their investments by going ‘overweight’ the 
index, while new types of ‘cross-over’ investors, such as global bond funds, hedge 
funds, and investment banks. For example, the EM bond allocations of Pacific 
Investment Management Company LLC (PIMCO), the largest global bond fund, 
which can be taken as representative of a large portion of the crossover market, shot 
up after 2009 from about 3% of its total return fund, to nearly 14% in 2012 (IMF 
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2013, 16). News of these investors entering the market fuelled expectations for further 
price increases. Lucrative profit opportunities encouraged new investors like non-
financial corporations to invest part of their reserves in EMs in order to boost profits. 
A similar profit motive applied to investors like central banks, SWFs, and university 
endowment funds, who took advantage of higher yielding EM assets to invest their 
large amounts of reserves (Interview 31, Investment Bank, EM Sales).  
It was not only short-term investors that played an important part in inflating 
EM bond prices. Investors thought of as traditionally ‘patient capital’ with 
diversification rather than profit motives, such as US, European and Japanese public 
and private pension funds an insurance funds, were not immune to the profitable 
opportunities offered by EM bonds either (Lee and Teo 2011).  The distinction 
between ‘profit’ and ‘diversification’ investment motivations became increasingly 
blurred in a low interest rate environment, as pension and insurance funds became 
involved in the desperate ‘search for yield’ abroad as they found they could no longer 
meet their liabilities solely from investment in low yielding AE assets.  For example 
in 2012, the California Public Employees Retirement System (CALPERS), America's 
biggest pension fund, needed to achieve an annualised target return of 7.75per cent, in 
order to meet its lawful obligations to pensioners. For a fund of its size ($220 billion) 
this could not be achieved by investing in domestic markets alone, when the 10-year 
US Treasury yield was less than two per cent. (Lord and Dibiasio 2012). European 
pension funds allocations to Asia alone were estimated to have gone from zero to five 
per cent of the fixed-income portfolios (Lee and Teo 2011, Stewart 2012).   EM 
investments were made both directly, and through increased allocations to asset 
managers. News of these large investors increasing their allocations sent positive 
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signals to the market, and attracted fresh capital (Interview 28, Investment Bank, USD 
EM Credit Trading). 
Investor perceptions of fundamentals during the mania 
Table 1. Push factors and investor perceptions of domestic fundamentals 
 
Source: Interviews, Factiva 
Post-crisis reports on fundamentals dramatically reversed from 2008 as a 
result of the push factors discussed above, and became even more positive than in the 
pre-crisis period, especially after the start of the Eurozone crisis (table 1). This was 
despite the fact that no major structural or policy changes occurred in major EM 
countries between 2008 and 2013, let alone between 2008 and 2009. In many cases, 
the same policies or macroeconomic indicators that had been looked at negatively 
during the 2008 crisis when the push factors were negative (figure 2 points, such as 
fiscal stimulus programs, were reinterpreted to be a sign of fundamental strength once 
the push factors turned positive (figure 2). An analysis of investor views of 
Financial'crisis'(2008) Eurozone'crisis'(201052013)
Push'
factors
1.#Negative#sentiment#and##risk#aversion#caused#
by#the#GFC#
1.#Negative#sentiment#caused#by#Eurozone#crisis#2.#
Low#interest#rates#in#AEs#drive#short#and#long#
term#investors#to#EM#3.#closing#off#of#US#subprime#
and#Peripheral#Eurozone#bond#market#narrows#
alternative#investment#options
Pull'factors
1.#Trade#impact#of#global#recession:#slow#growth#
in#AEs#seen#to#reduce#EM#exports,#and#cause#
growth#to#slow.#Reliance#on#commodity#exports#
seen#as#a#major#risk.
2.#Fiscal#policy:#Fiscal#stimulus#programs#by#key#
EMs#criticised#for#increasing#indebtedness#and#
creating#longer#term#distortions.
3.#Debt#ratios:#Seen#as#worsening#due#to#low#
growth#and#fiscal#stimulus
4.#FX#reserves:#worries#over#declining#FX#
reserves#
5.#Structural#reforms:#Excessive#government#
intervention#seen#as#distortionary#
6.#Inflation:#rising#inflation#seen#as#a#major#
threat
1.#Trade#impact#of#global#recession:#'decoupling'#
of#EM#and#AE#growth#rates
2.#Fiscal#policy:#Fiscal#stimulus#by#key#EMs#seen#as#
leading#to#higher#growth.
3.#Debt#ratios:#considered#very#strong#and#
compared#favourably#to#AEs
4.#FX#reserves:#extensive#reserves#hailed#as#a#key#
strength
5.#Structural#reforms:#financial#and#trade#
liberalisation,#inflationUtargeting#monetary#
regimes,#floating#exchange#rates,#and#the#
implementation#of#fiscal#rules#seen#as#leaving#EMs#
in#a#good#position#to#tackle#the#fallout#from#the#
crisis.
6.#Inflation:#not#seen#as#a#major#issue#
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fundamentals between 2009 and 2013 reveals a narrative of a dramatic structural 
turnaround in EM economies due to better policies, permanently decreased EM risk, 
and EM economies outperforming, and eventually catching up with, AEs, especially 
after the second quarter of 2009.  
Whereas during the panic phase in late 2008 investors were expecting slowing 
growth in AEs to cause slower growth in EMs due to trade links, after 2009 investors 
predicted a ‘decoupling’ of AE and EM growth rates (Foundation and Endowment 
Money Management 2009). They emphasised EM countries strong trade surpluses, 
even though AE growth continued to slow between 2009 and 2012 and EM countries’ 
export dependence on them had not lessened during this time. In fact, IMF data shows 
that, although the aggregate category of ‘emerging and developing countries’ were 
running a current account surplus, this was actually on average lower in the post-crisis 
period than it had been before the crisis (see figure 4).  
Figure 3. Aggregate current account balance and major debt indicators for EM 
countries, 2005-13 
	 29	
 
Source: IMF online database, Balance of Payments Yearbook, World and 
regional Aggregates; World Bank, International Debt Statistics. Note: Current account 
data is for ‘Emerging and Developing countries’ category from IMF Balance of 
Payments Yearbook. Debt data is for middle and low-income group aggregate in 
which 2013 GNI per capita was $12,745 or less 
Similarly, while investors had been predicting a decline in foreign exchange 
reserves at the end of 2008, ‘extensive’ reserves were hailed as a key strength in EMs, 
especially in Asia after 2009 (Nordic Region Pensions and Investment News 2012, 
Ankarcrona 2012). According to 2010 report by Goldman Sachs, foreign exchange 
reserves had helped to moderate ‘country-risk’, and were now ‘perceived by investors 
as more significant than a country's immediate fiscal situation’ (Roman 2010).  These 
dramatic sentiment shifts occurred between 2008 and 2009 despite the fact that the 
building up for foreign reserves was a much longer-term trend, beginning after 1997 
Asian financial crisis (Ocampo, Kregel and Griffith-Jones 2007, 21-25).  
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EM fiscal and debt ratios were also described as being very strong, and were 
almost always analysed in relation to deteriorating fiscal conditions in AEs, especially 
in Europe26. While fiscal stimulus programs such as those undertaken by Brazil and 
China were criticised for leading to higher debt and longer term ‘distortions’ in 2008, 
they became seen as contributing to growth in EMs after the turnaround in push 
factors (Belaisch 2010).  At the same time, similar fiscal spending was seen as leading 
to higher indebtedness in AEs, echoed by the following statement from a PM at 
Franklin Templeton: ‘The tables have turned. Now the highly indebted are the 
developed markets’ (Hershey 2010)27. According to a portfolio manager at the 
Oppenheimer International Bond fund28, even ‘onetime fiscal ‘basket cases' are 
performing better than developed countries as a group these days... They're doing the 
right things, running the right policies’ (Hershey 2010). However, IMF data on major 
debt indicators for EM countries show that not only was there no dramatic 
improvement after 2008, but that there was a slight deterioration in some debt 
indicators such as external debt to GNI and debt service to exports, in 2009, the year 
when massive inflows began (see figure 3). 
A belief that became widespread among investors during this time was that 
EM countries were in a fundamentally better position approaching this global 
recession than they had been in at any point in history, and so would be able to deal 
with the fallout of the crisis much better. This was attributed to policy changes and 
structural reforms including financial and trade liberalization, inflation-targeting 
monetary regimes, floating exchange rates, and the implementation of fiscal rules, 
which ‘established the conditions for stability and success’, according to the executive 
vice president of PIMCO29 (Mamudi 2009). In 2009, the head of EMs at Aberdeen 
Asset Management30 stated, ‘We believe they [EMs] are more capable today of 
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dealing with perhaps the worst global financial crisis in our lifetime, due to stronger 
balance sheets and more prudent macroeconomic policies’ (Asian Investor 2009). 
Some analysts went so far as to say that as a result of these developments, ‘the days of 
extreme emerging-market risk are coming to an end’ (Mamudi 2009). The head of 
EM equities at Schroders31 went as far as to say that this ‘major structural change’ 
was ‘certainly as significant as the industrial revolution, and perhaps more so’ (Evans 
2010). This was despite the fact that most of these liberalisation reforms had occurred 
in various EM countries between the 1990s and early 2000s, over a decade before the 
2009 inflows began32.  
Discussion and conclusion 
This paper has used qualitative evidence, including detailed interviews with 
market participants themselves, to argue that not only were push factors more 
important in driving EM portfolio investment during and after the GFC, but also that 
investors’ perceptions of domestic fundamentals were influenced by the change in 
push factors, causing them to become divorced from reality. The paper further shows 
how the micro-foundations of investors’ decision-making behaviour makes them even 
more susceptible to push factors. This does not mean that domestic factors are 
completely irrelevant, but rather that a degree of caution should be exercised when 
analyzing investors’ interpretations of them. Rather than taking investors’ 
interpretations at face value, it should be remembered that these are subjective 
perceptions of the average opinion of the fundamentals. 
Due to the micro-foundations, even if investors do not personally agree with 
the average opinion of the domestic fundamentals, it is still rational for them to invest 
according to others investors’ behaviour, as this is what moves the market. Investors 
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were fully aware of the importance of push factors, even using various proxies to 
measure their direction and effect, and were also aware the average opinion of the 
domestic fundamentals might be incorrect. Due to the high level of global capital 
mobility, even if the market view of the fundamentals turns out to be incorrect, 
investors can easily reallocate their capital to some other asset class during the panic 
phase, in order to maintain their short-term profits. Despite their different investment 
strategies and mandates, all kinds of foreign investors were subject to speculative 
behaviour, vulnerable to shorter-term market pressures, influenced by developments 
in other asset classes, and most importantly, had the option to exit EM markets. 
This paper’s main argument, that push factors are fundamentally more 
important than pull factors, even when investors do pay attention to the country 
fundamentals, although not definitive, questions the prevailing wisdom in current IPE 
literature, that financial markets can constrain or discipline EM government policy 
through the market mechanism, even during periods of low international liquidity. 
Outflows during the downturn are not primarily due to investors closely inspecting 
country fundamentals, but due to a panicked exit, as developments elsewhere in the 
world trigger capital flight, regardless of whether EM governments institute policies 
according to investors’ preferences. This does not mean that financial market 
borrowing does not pose a constraint on EM governments33, but rather that this 
constraint does not occur directly through the market mechanism, as implied in the 
IPE literature, since market signals do not always convey information accurately, and 
especially not during a crisis.   
This paper contributes to a body of research that argues that reliance on 
financial markets for international borrowing can leave developing country 
governments at the mercy of factors beyond their control, subject to volatile 
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international capital flows, sometimes at massive economic and social costs. If push 
factors are more important than pull factors in driving capital flows, this means that 
government efforts to attract foreign capital or reduce borrowing costs through 
implementing these investors’ preferred policies may be ultimately futile. In 
conjunction with a large body of literature on developing country financial crises and 
boom and bust cycles34, this study points towards the need for some degree of capital 
controls to counter the destabilizing effects of international financial markets 
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2 In order for the ‘financial market constraint’ to work, governments also have to be 
responsive to price changes in financial markets (Mosley 2003). This side of the story is 
outside the scope of this paper, which only focuses on financial market reactions. 
3 Hardie 2012 correctly emphasises that domestic EM investors are holding increasing 
amounts of foreign currency denominated debt. Nevertheless, in the market in question, 
foreign investors move their capital more often, and therefore, have more of an effect on 
prices (Interviews) and therefore, will be the focus of this paper. 
4 Seeking to mitigate exposure to risk from any asset class, country, or region over the long 
term 
5 Exceptions to this narrative include for Toporowski (2000), and Bonizzi (2017), which 
highlight the role of pension funds in increasing financial market volatility in EMs.  
6 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for making this point. The effect of pull factors on push 
factors is much smaller. Domestic fundamentals of individual EMs could be expected to have 
minimal real or sentiment based impact on global push factors (Interviews) 
7	These clients included the largest hedge funds, asset management companies, pension 
funds, and insurance funds, and private wealth managers, corporate non-financial companies, 
and official investors such as central banks and sovereign wealth funds	
8 Which covers major news sources that interviewees identified as relevant including Reuters, 
Dow Jones Newswires, Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, Euromoney, MarketWatch, and 
Pension’s Week 
9 This paper focuses mainly on the hard currency sovereign bond market, and the 10-year 
benchmark government bond because it best reflects market conditions (Mosley 2003). 
10 Disaggregated data on investment flows by asset class and investor type is not readily 
available. Such data exists in the EPFR database, which is proprietary and not available for 
academic use.  The IMF GFSR only provides data on investment flows by US mutual funds 
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11 The most detailed publicly available breakdown of EM investors is available from the IMF 
(Arslanalp and Tsuda 2014) but does not differentiate within the foreign non-bank investors 
category, or between foreign and local currency EM bonds. Hardie (2012) provides further 
detail on the different types of EM investor, but quantitative estimates only for three 
countries. 
12 The terms mutual fund and asset manager are used interchangeably. 
13 BIS estimates suggest that over 90% of mutual funds in EMs are open end (Miyajima and 
Shim 2014, 20). 
14 A dealer in financial market securities who is obliged to buy and sell securities at all times 
in order to provide ‘liquidity’ to the market. They play the role of middleman, connecting 
various ‘counterparties’ or investors to buy and sell securities from each other. 
15 Market-making traders are different from ‘proprietary’ traders in investment banks, which 
invest in order to make profits for the bank, similar to an in-house asset management 
function. Regulatory moves have been taken to ban proprietary trading by investment banks, 
which have commercial banking arms.  
16 Here, the benchmark is the investors’ reference point in constructing their portfolio, with 
any deviations from the index reflecting a decision to overweight/underweight certain bonds 
that they think will over/under perform. 
17 Other criteria for inclusion and weighting include price, and tradability and liquidity of the 
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18	Market capitalisation rather than total returns are used because this indicator gives 
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22 This is consistent with the predictions of Prospect theory (i.e. one’s higher propensity to 
loss avoidance compared to pursuit of gains). Even though some investors believed that 
fundamentals were more positive than was reflected in prices, they did not want to take the 
risk of holding on to their investments in the hope that prices would go back up in the longer 
term, because they were more averse to the short-term losses they would incur with such an 
investment strategy. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for making this point. 
23 One of the largest British investment managers specialised in EM. 
24 Other events that resulted in negative risk sentiment (as shown by increases in the VIX 
index in figure 2), including S&P’s downgrade of the US from triple to double A+ in August 
2011 due to the fiscal cliff (figure 2, point r), and various Greek and Irish bailouts in 2010 and 
2011 (figure 2, point m, o, q) caused only brief outflows, with investors quickly going back 
into EM due to the lack of investment alternatives. 
25 For example, when Moody’s upgraded Brazil to investment grade status in September 
2009, even though this had widely been anticipated by the market, it led to additional inflows 
as it widened the range of funds that were allowed to invest in it (Vyas 2009) 
26 According to a report by Standard Chartered Bank26, ‘Asia’ was seen as having especially 
good fundamentals in this regard: ‘If the financial market is looking to penalise fiscal 
imprudence and reward countries with fiscal discipline, many Asian economies with low 
fiscal deficits and debt should benefit’ (Chatterjee 2010). Even ‘Latin America’, historically 
known for debt crisis and sovereign defaults, was seen as one of the ‘best examples of this 
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27 By 2012, some investors were of the view that ‘some of the [EM] countries are in even 
better positions than the key developed markets’ (Ankarcrona 2012). 
28 A specialised bond fund that is part of OFI Global, an American asset management 
company 
29 The largest global bond investor, with a large presence in EMs. 
30 A global investment group with a large presence in EMs. 
31 One of the largest global asset management companies. 
32 Furthermore, although these liberalization reforms, including the removal of capital 
controls and financial market development, were seen as unconditionally positive, evidence 
of their success has been mixed at best, especially in terms of promoting financial stability 
(see Arestis and Glickman 2002 and Singh 2003 for a review).	
33 Over-reliance on financial market borrowing may create a situation where in the bust time, 
because financial market borrowing becomes more difficult for emerging markets regardless 
of domestic policy orientation, these countries may be forced to go back to financing sources 
with hard conditionalities, such as the IMF, especially if sharp outflows cause a financial 
crisis. International financial investors can also express their policy preferences to 
governments more directly. Close networks between investment bankers and senior EM 
politicians are common, as governments are bank clients for the issuing and marketing of 
bonds on international markets and privatizations, and meetings are often held between large 
institutional investors and policymakers.  
34 See for example Grabel (1996), Palma (1998), Singh (1997; 2003), Chang Palma and 
Whittaker (2001), Ocampo, Kregel and Griffith-Jones (2007), Kaltenbrunner and Panicera 
(2018). 	
